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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Flight Safety Requires Awareness
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• Flight requirements awareness
– e.g. NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8715.6a
• Technical understanding
– NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) 
Team
• Communication/coordination
– Space is congested by many unique owner/operators (O/O)
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis 
(CARA) Operational Process Overview
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• Generate daily close approach 
predictions
• Provide state and state 
uncertainty information for 
primary and secondary objects
• Provide miss distance 
Summaries
• Provide object tracking 
information
• Automated event reporting
• Conjunction event trending
• Qualitative assessment of orbit determination 
solutions
• Conjunction geometry examination
• Recommendations to Mission Operations Team
• Avoidance maneuver planning
• Maneuver execution
JSpOC
(VAFB)
NASA Robotic CARA Team 
(NASA GSFC)
Mission Operations Teams
(Global)
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• Maintain High Accuracy 
Space Object Catalog
• Interface with Space 
Surveillance Network
• Request Increase Tracking 
Data Collects
• Perform CA Risk Analysis
• Interface with JSpOC analysts to ensure 
data product delivery & quality
• Assist Mission Operations Teams with 
avoidance maneuver strategy
• Provide ephemeris (state 
& covariance) to NASA 
Robotic CARA Team for 
evaluation
• Weigh CA event risk 
against other mission 
risks
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Missions Supported
• Robotic CARA team supports 
~60 spacecraft in LEO, GEO, 
and HEO orbits, including:
– All Operational NASA 
unmanned satellites 
– USGS
– NOAA
– Foreign partner missions
– Commercial companies
• JSC supports Manned 
Spaceflight (ISS and visiting 
vehicles). The Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis mission at NASA 
GSFC is to protect NASA robotic assets from threats posed by 
other space objects while operating in the space environment 
through ensuring domain expertise, a robust concept of 
operations, and an operationally‐responsive system to meet 
the expanding needs of the mission area
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Flight Safety Challenges
1. Proliferation of CubeSats increases collision risk
– ISS deployments
– Secondary payloads
– Non-traditional operators, e.g. student groups
2. Satellite co-locations pose systematic collision risk
– Certain orbits particularly valuable for specific applications
– Possible to launch a satellite into orbital location where other 
satellite(s) are already operating
3. Communication process between owner/operators of 
operational spacecraft is not always robust
– Particularly true for international parties
• In the following charts, these challenges are discussed and 
potential solutions are proposed
– Orbital registry
– Standard communication template
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
CubeSats: Case Study
• Throughout the month of February 2014, a constellation of 
CubeSats known as Flock-1 was deployed from the ISS
• The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission launched 
into a near-circular orbit very close to ISS altitude on February 27
– GPM did not have the ability to perform maneuvers immediately after 
launch
• Both spacecraft had NASA involvement, so communication 
channels were opened prior to GPM launch to determine risk 
posed and mitigation options
– GPM: joint NASA/JAXA, Flock-1: PlanetLabs payloads deployed by NASA
• Coordination between ISS and GPM operations teams allowed risk 
to be communicated and avoided to the extent possible
– No high risk events were encountered during GPM’s early orbit phase
• Regular discussions now take place between operators at the ISS 
altitude to ensure activities are coordinated to reduce collision risk
6
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Co-Locations Cause Collision Risk
• The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) currently assures 
that no two spacecraft are placed such that Radio Frequency 
Interference exists between them
• No similar mechanism exists to ensure that new orbit assignments 
are chosen to avoid co-location with existing spacecraft
• Historically, repeating conjunctions that could have been avoided 
have resulted from poor placement choices
– Landsat-5 changed its mission orbit many years after launch and passed 
through the A-Train constellation
– SDO co-located with SkyTerra 1 and MSAT-M2; GOES co-located with 
BrazilSat because no checks were done pre-launch to look for neighbors
– EO-1 was co-manifested with SAC-C without a separation plan, resulting in 
systematic close approaches post-launch
– ISS moved to TRMM altitude after Shuttle ended
• Missions in formulation, missions making a change to their 
existing orbit, and missions moving to a 
disposal/decommissioning orbit are potential sources of 
systematic (repeating) conjunctions
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
• In February 2010, Landsat-5 was periodically experiencing unreported 
close approaches with A-Train constellation missions
• It was determined that a change in mission orbit had caused Landsat-5 to 
walk through the constellation, causing close approaches with each 
member mission
• A Tiger Team was formed to determine why the close approaches had 
gone unreported
– An algorithm to eliminate object self screening at the JSpOC 
prevented subscribers of the CARA (Conjunction Assessment Risk 
Analysis) system from being checked against other subscribers.
– An updated operational procedure was implemented promptly after the 
discovery.
• The Tiger Team was also chartered with suggesting process 
improvements to prevent future close approaches
– One suggestion was the formation of an Orbital Registry
Landsat Tiger Team
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Proposed Solution:  
NASA Orbital Registry
• An “Orbital Registry” capability is proposed to prevent such 
problems between spacecraft
• Orbital Registry would:
– Be a central repository for orbit requirements definition
– Proposed orbital placements or changes to existing orbits would be 
reported to the registry
– Registry analysts determine whether a problem will ensue from the 
placement.
– Recommendations are made for alternative placement
• Allows for advance notice of potential co-locations so that they can 
be avoided or managed smartly
• Reduces operations manpower required to mitigate systematic 
close approaches
• NASA only has enforcement power for issues between two NASA 
assets.  Other assets would be managed voluntarily by the 
owner/operator
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
Expanded Orbital Registry
• The more organizations that participate, the more 
effective this mechanism will be.
• Other agencies could volunteer to share their 
information in a joint working group-type setting
⎯ Voluntary sharing of orbit requirements
⎯ Joint analysis of proposed placement could be performed to 
determine potential impacts and mitigation strategies
⎯ Changes to the proposed placement would be at the discretion 
of the launching agency
• In the short term, NASA would like to collect point of 
contact information for other operators to help to most 
efficiently resolve any close approach situations
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
• International registry collects data from all space operators to 
ensure co-locations are
– Minimized
– Predicted before launch
– Mitigated appropriately
• Risk reduction:
– All historical co-location cases mentioned in this package could have been 
prevented by an orbital registry capability
• Way ahead
– Analyst staff to communicate with operators to collect and analyze data, and 
make recommendations will be needed proportional to the number of 
analysis requests 
– Combining the registry with the existing CARA staff and infrastructure 
provides a natural synergy with a team that has similar interfaces and skills.
– Cost/resource sharing would be needed for the workload to be supported
Desired End State
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
• As space becomes more congested, effective and timely 
communication between O/O becomes increasingly important
– JSpOC and Space Data Association (SDA) can provide information 
about conjunctions
– O/O contact info not always available
• Orbital registry provides means to collect this information
• NASA has developed a standard template for communicating 
conjunction risk and includes relevant information such as
– Timing of conjunction
– Risk level
– Maneuver plans for the CARA-supported asset, if applicable
• NASA has used this template on several occasions to 
communicate a complete picture of the conjunction situation, 
including risk and mitigation plans
– Including to international O/O
Communication Challenges
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N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
FSO Template Status: Template 
Sample (1 of 2)  Theoretical Example—fictitious data
To the operator of Envisat:
NASA has identified a close approach between the satellite Aura (satellite catalog number 28376) and the 
satellite Envisat (satellite catalog number 27386). The Time of Closest Approach (TCA) is 2014 Jan 23 12:34:56 
UTC. The miss distance prediction as of 2014 Jan 17 18:00:00 UTC is 45.0  meters and the NASA Robotic 
Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team is computing a Collision Probability of 1.42E-2, assuming 
a combined hard-body radius of 20 m.
We believe this close approach poses a high collision risk if neither satellite maneuvers.  The owner-operator of 
Aura plans to maneuver its satellite between now and the time of closest approach.  This maneuver is expected 
to mitigate the risk of collision.  Is it possible to avoid maneuvering your satellite before the time of closest 
approach?  If not and you are planning to execute a maneuver between now and time of closest approach, would 
it be possible to share your plans with the CARA Team in an effort to avoid a collision?  If so, please share your 
plans in the form of (a) an ephemeris modeling the maneuver, or (b) pre- and post-maneuver state vectors.
Aura is currently planning a 5.2 cm/s orbit raise maneuver on 2014 Jan 20, at 18:00:00 UTC. We expect to 
provide status updates daily at approximately 15:00 UTC.
As of 2014 Jan 17 19:00:00 UTC, the current MJ2000 Predicted Post-Maneuver State Vector of Aura is
Epoch:  2014 Jan 20 18:15:00.000 UTC
<X, Y, Z; VX, VY, VZ> (km; km/s): <1234.000, 2345.000, 3456.000; 4.000000, 5.000000, 6.000000>
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
NASA prefers that both spacecraft not maneuver to mitigate the risk of the same close approach, in order to 
prevent adding uncertainty to the problem. From a safety perspective, NASA prefers that any maneuver by one 
of the involved spacecraft not occur within 24 hours of a maneuver by the other involved spacecraft.
If your organization has established an account on Space-Track.org, the JSpOC may be able to provide you 
with Conjunction Summary Messages (CSMs) to assist in your risk assessment.
NOTE: You may receive an automated message from the US Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
containing information similar to what is presented here. The information contained in such an automated 
message may differ from the data presented here, although the data presented here do originate from the 
JSpOC as well.
If you have any questions, please contact the NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) 
team via email at cara-ops@lists.nasa.gov; via the CARA Operations Center phone at +1-301-286-9545 from 
0800-1600 US Eastern Time, Monday through Friday; or via the CARA on-call cell phone at +1-301-789-4306 
outside of those hours.
FSO Template Status: Template 
Sample (2 of 2)  Theoretical Example—fictitious data
N A S A R O B O T I C  C A R A
• Effective planning and communication are essential to 
safety of flight for operational satellites
• The proposed orbital registry serves as a way to 
proactively mitigate on-orbit collision risk
• The standard communication template allows O/O to 
describe relevant conjunction information in a concise 
and timely manner
Conclusion
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